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Biological market theory models the action of natural selection as a marketplace in which animals are
viewed as traders with commodities to offer and exchange. Studies of female Old World monkeys have
suggested that grooming might be employed as a commodity to be reciprocated or traded for alternative
services, yet previous tests of this grooming-trade model in wild adult male chimpanzees have yielded
mixed results. Here we provide the strongest test of the model to date for male chimpanzees: we use
data drawn from two social groups (communities) of chimpanzees from different populations and give
explicit consideration to variation in dominance hierarchy steepness, as such variation results in differing
conditions for biological markets. First, analysis of data from published accounts of other chimpanzee
communities, together with our own data, showed that hierarchy steepness varied considerably within
and across communities and that the number of adult males in a community aged 20e30 years predicted
hierarchy steepness. The two communities in which we tested predictions of the grooming-trade model
lay at opposite extremes of this distribution. Second, in accord with the grooming-trade model, we found
evidence that male chimpanzees trade grooming for agonistic support where hierarchies are steep
(despotic) and consequent effective support is a rank-related commodity, but not where hierarchies are
shallow (egalitarian). However, we also found that grooming was reciprocated regardless of hierarchy
steepness. Our ﬁndings also hint at the possibility of agonistic competition, or at least exclusion, in
relation to grooming opportunities compromising the free market envisioned by biological market
theory. Our results build on previous ﬁndings across chimpanzee communities to emphasize the
importance of reciprocal grooming exchanges among adult male chimpanzees, which can be understood
in a biological markets framework if grooming by or with particular individuals is a valuable commodity.
© 2014 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Biological market theory (BMT) models the action of natural
selection on behavioural strategies as a marketplace in which ani-
mals (or at least the strategies they embody) can be viewed as
traders with commodities (behavioural interactions) to offer and
exchange (Barrett & Henzi, 2001; No€e, 2001, 2006; No€e &
Hammerstein, 1994, 1995). The amount or quality of the com-
modity exchanged is contingent on the classical market forces of
supply and demand such that when supply is low, or demand is
high, a commodity has greater value (No€e, 2001, 2006; No€e &
Hammerstein, 1994, 1995). For example, commodities held by a
small proportion of individuals are more valuable than those that
can be provided by a larger number of group members (No€e &
Hammerstein, 1994, 1995). Consequently, BMT accounts for the
presence of asymmetric relationships if some individuals hold a
highly attractive commodity for which their partners would
compete (No€e, 1990, 2001). Multiple studies have proffered BMT as
an explanation for the trade of commodities in social animals, such
as the exchange of services in primates (e.g. Barrett, Gaynor, &
Henzi, 2002; Barrett & Henzi, 2006; Barrett, Henzi, Weingrill,
Lycett, & Hill, 1999; Fruteau, Voelkl, van Damme, & No€e, 2009;
Gumert, 2007; Koyama, Caws, & Aureli, 2012; Norscia, Antonacci,
& Palagi, 2009), between cleaner ﬁshes and their clients (Bshary,
2001; Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Bshary & No€e, 2003; Bshary &
Sch€affer, 2002), the exchange of protection for nectar between
ants and aphids (Fischer, Hoffmann, & V€olkl, 2001; Leimar & Axen,
1993), the nutrient exchange between plants and fungi in
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mycorrhiza (Hoeksema & Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz & Hoeksema,
1998) and in the trading of grooming for mating between male
and female wood mice (Apodemus sylvaticus: Stopka & Macdonald,
1999).
Nonhuman primates provide goodmodel systems to explore the
applicability of BMT, as they show a range of cooperative behav-
ioural exchanges, such as grooming (Henzi & Barrett, 1999; Russell
& Phelps, 2013; Schino& Aureli, 2008), agonistic support (Harcourt
& de Waal, 1992) and food transfer (Brown, Almond, & Bergen,
2004). Under the framework set by BMT, studies of the social
behaviour of female cercopithecoids (Old World monkeys) have
suggested that grooming might be used as a commodity to be
either reciprocated or traded for alternative services, depending on
the goods the individuals can offer in the market (Barrett et al.,
2002, 1999; Seyfarth, 1976, 1977, 1980). In addition, a meta-
analysis of 14 monkey species found that females have a general
tendency to groom high-ranking individuals (Schino, 2001), and
there is also evidence that monkeys tend to reciprocate grooming
time (Carne, Wiper, & Semple, 2011; Frank & Silk, 2009; Leinfelder,
de Vries, Deleu, & Nelissen, 2001; Schino & Aureli, 2008; Schino, di
Giuseppe, & Visalberghi, 2009; Ventura, Majolo, Koyama, Hardie, &
Schino, 2006; Xia et al., 2012; Xia et al., 2013), with less reciprocal
grooming in groups with steeper rank relationships
(Balasubramaniam et al., 2012), as well as trading grooming for
rank-related beneﬁts such as agonistic support (Carne et al., 2011;
Hemelrijk, 1994; Schino, di Sorrentino, & Tiddi, 2007; Seyfarth &
Cheney, 1984; Silk, 1992), tolerance in feeding contexts (Carne
et al., 2011; Richter, Mevis, Malaivijitnond, Schülke, & Ostner,
2009; Tiddi, Aureli, di Sorrentino, Janson, & Schino, 2011) and
reduction of aggression (Gumert & Ho, 2008; Ventura et al., 2006;
Xia et al., 2012; Xia et al., 2013). This ‘grooming-trade’ model posits
that as high-ranking individuals can potentially offer dominance-
restricted beneﬁts such as agonistic support (Seyfarth, 1977, 1980)
or access to food resources (Barrett et al., 1999), subordinates use
grooming as a ‘currency’ with which to ‘buy’ these services. The
extent to which grooming is traded for other beneﬁts depends on
individuals' ability (or possibility) to monopolize resources (Barrett
et al., 2002, 1999; Henzi et al., 2003). Under the model, when in-
dividuals are not able to offer alternative services (commodities),
such as when rank relationships are shallow (egalitarian hierar-
chies: van Schaik, 1989; Vehrencamp, 1983) or access to resources
cannot be controlled (e.g. when food is scattered), then grooming is
exchanged for itself (i.e. reciprocated: Barrett et al., 1999). In
practice, commodities such as agonistic support are likely to be
rank-related rather than dominance-restricted as most individuals
should be able to offer the commodity, but its quality (e.g. the
effectiveness of agonistic support) will depend on the trader's rank.
Previous tests of the grooming-trade model in wild adult male
chimpanzees have yielded mixed results. While there is ample
evidence that male chimpanzees reciprocate services such as
grooming (Arnold & Whiten, 2003; Boesch & Boesch-Achermann,
2000; Gomes, Mundry, & Boesch, 2009; Mitani, 2006; Newton-
Fisher, 1997; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011; Watts, 2000a), meat ex-
change (Gilby, 2006; Mitani, 2006; Mitani & Watts, 2001) and
agonistic support (Gomes & Boesch, 2011; Mitani, 2006; Mitani,
Merriwether, & Zhang, 2000), evidence that adult male chimpan-
zees trade grooming to access rank-related services is still scant and
inconsistent across communities. In agreement with the grooming-
trade model, adult male chimpanzees of the Ngogo community
(Kibale National Park, Uganda) tended to direct grooming up the
social dominance hierarchy, with most reciprocity occurring be-
tween individuals with similar social ranks (Watts, 2000b), while
data collected frommales of the Sonso community (Budongo Forest
Reserve, Uganda) in 1994/1995 revealed that males directed
grooming up the hierarchy, but grooming reciprocity was not
stronger among males holding similar ranks (Newton-Fisher & Lee,
2011).
By contrast, no relationship was found between rank and the
distribution of grooming for chimpanzees of M-group (Mahale
National Park, Tanzania), or North-group and South-group in the
Taï National Park, Co^te D'Ivoire (Boesch & Boesch-Achermann,
2000; Gomes & Boesch, 2011; Gomes et al., 2009; Watts, 2000b).
With respect to trading, dominant males in the Ngogo community
were more likely than subordinates to provide agonistic support
(Watts, 2002) and grooming was traded for agonistic support as
well as for meat (Mitani, 2006; Watts, 2002). Conversely, South-
group chimpanzees were not found to trade grooming for other
commodities, but exchanged agonistic support for meat (Gomes &
Boesch, 2011). These ﬁndings hint at differences across commu-
nities, although the reasons behind them are not yet fully under-
stood. Watts (2000b) argued that group size could partly explain
these differences, yet the relationship between grooming distri-
bution and rank in the large Ngogo community is also present in
the smaller Sonso community (Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011), whose
size is comparable to M-group where the relationship is absent. A
full understanding of the patterns of grooming among male
chimpanzees and the extent to which these can be explained by
models such as biological market theory therefore requires studies
that incorporate data from multiple social groups.
Barrett and colleagues (Barrett et al., 1999; Henzi et al., 2003)
proposed that for the grooming-trade model to be valid, it should
be shown that (1) high-ranking individuals can offer subordinates
one or more commodities, other than grooming, that subordinates
cannot or are less likely to offer to dominants (e.g. agonistic sup-
port, social tolerance), (2) individuals direct grooming up the hi-
erarchy (i.e. individuals predominantly groom those who are
socially dominant to them), (3) dominants receive more grooming
than they give and (4) group members adjacent in rank engage in
grooming that is more reciprocal than that between individuals
holding more distant ranks. Furthermore, these trading patterns
should be contingent on hierarchy steepness, decreasing or
potentially disappearing in favour of reciprocity of grooming where
hierarchies are shallow (Barrett et al., 1999; Stevens, Vervaecke, de
Vries, & van Elsacker, 2005). As such, the grooming-trade model is
best tested by studying the same group under different conditions,
or different groups with different social structures
(Balasubramaniam, Berman, Ogawa, & Li, 2011; Barrett et al., 2002,
1999; Jaeggi, Stevens, & van Schaik, 2010; Stevens et al., 2005).
Despite this, most investigations have focused on single social
groups (Barrett & Henzi, 2001; Kappeler & van Schaik, 2006;
Schino & Aureli, 2009).
The ‘grooming-trade’ model has its origins in Seyfarth's (1977,
1980) classic model of social grooming, in essence a markets-
based approach (Barrett & Henzi, 2006). However, Seyfarth's
model differs from BMT in a number of respects (Henzi et al., 2003).
In particular, it postulates that the distribution of grooming is
constrained by social rank (high-ranking individuals have ﬁrst
choice of partners) whereas BMT assumes this is traded freely ac-
cording to market forces. Thus, while both predict that grooming
should be most reciprocal between individuals close in rank,
different mechanisms are assumed: rank-mediated competition
under Seyfarth's model and a lack of alternative, more valuable,
commodities under BMT. This difference provides an opportunity
to distinguish between the two: Seyfarth's model predicts that
grooming (not just most reciprocity) should be largely restricted to
individuals adjacent in rank (Seyfarth, 1977, 1980) whereas a BMT
model predicts that grooming should be distributed among all
dyads, albeit with reciprocity correlating negatively with rank
distance and with high-ranking individuals (or at least, those who
hold commodities for which groomers wish to trade) receiving far
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more grooming than they perform due to outbidding competition
(R. No€e, personal communication).
Here we test the grooming-trade model using data from two
wild communities of East African chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes
schweinfurthii: Sonso (Budongo Forest Reserve, Uganda) and M-
group (Mahale Mountains National Park, Tanzania). We test for
each of Barrett and colleagues' (Barrett et al., 1999; Henzi et al.,
2003) four conditions, as presented above, namely: (1) the exis-
tence of rank-related commodities; (2) grooming directed up the
hierarchy; (3) dominants receiving more grooming than sub-
ordinates; and (4) closely ranked individuals showing more reci-
procity in their grooming (i.e. reciprocity correlating negatively
with rank distance). To differentiate between Seyfarth's (1977)
classic model and BMT further, we assess (5) whether total
grooming effort is largely restricted to individuals of adjacent rank
(as predicted by Seyfarth's (1977) classic model) or spread across
available partners (as predicted by BMT). We consider these
explicitly in light of variation in dominance hierarchy steepness,
with the expectation that (6) reciprocity in grooming should be
stronger where hierarchies are shallower, while under steep hier-
archies, grooming should instead be traded for rank-related bene-
ﬁts such as agonistic support and tolerance.
METHODS
Study Sites and Subjects
The Sonso community lives in semi-deciduous tropical forest in
the Budongo Forest Reserve, Uganda (Eggeling, 1947; Plumptre,
1996; Reynolds, 2005), and has been studied continuously since
1994 (Newton-Fisher, 1997; Reynolds, 2005). For this study,
behavioural data on Sonso chimpanzees were collected between
December 2003 and August 2004. During data collection, the
community consisted of 63 individuals including eight adult males
(16 years old) and 21 adult females (14 years old). The M-group
community lives in the semi-evergreen Kasoje Forest of the Mahale
Mountains National Park and has been studied continuously since
early 1980s (Nakamura & Nishida, 2012; Nishida, 1990, 2012). Data
on M-group chimpanzees were collected for this study between
February and November 2011. At the beginning of our observations,
this community consisted of 60 individuals, including 10 adult
males and 23 adult females (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013). For
both communities, we collected data as part of our broader studies
of social behaviour that sampled behaviour of both adult males and
adult females. This research complied with the regulations set by
the Ethics Committee of the University of Kent, the protocols of
both the Budongo Forest Project (now BCFS) and the Mahale
Mountains Wildlife Research Center and the legal requirements of
Uganda and Tanzania.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data on grooming and agonistic interactions were collected
using all-occurrence sampling (Altmann, 1974) within focal parties
(i.e. all occurrences of these interactions that occurred in a party
that contained a nominal focal animal, where party is deﬁned as a
subgroup produced by the ﬂuid ﬁssionefusion social system). We
used 15 min interval instantaneous scan sampling to record the
identities of the individuals present in the same party as the focal
animal (i.e. association). Parties were followed for as long as
possible from ﬁrst encounter until nesting; focal animals were
identiﬁed to allow unbiased decisions on which animals to observe
when parties ﬁssioned. If contact with chimpanzees was lost due to
terrain and/or chimpanzee movement patterns, we searched for
and observed the next party encountered that contained one of the
predetermined focal animals. We recorded data on association,
grooming and agonistic interactions, hunting and agonistic support
through audio narration, by pen and paper, or, for some social in-
teractions, on videotape. We recorded a total of 1109.5 h of obser-
vation of the Sonso community over 159 days/follows (median
observation per day¼ 7 h); we conducted 141 focal follows of the
M-group chimpanzees for a total of 800.9 h of observation (median
observation per day ¼ 6.3 h). Individual Sonso adult males were
under observation for a mean ± SD duration of 358.8 ± 74.5 h
(median observation: 356.7 h). Individual M-group adult male
chimpanzees were under observation for a mean ± SD duration of
49.7 ± 5.4 h (median observation: 49.3 h). Except where stated, all
analyses are of these two data sets. During data collection, the alpha
male of M-group was killed during an intracommunity gang attack
(Kaburu, Inoue, & Newton-Fisher, 2013). A period of social insta-
bility followed, during which aggression rates were signiﬁcantly
elevated, male rank was unstable and grooming bouts were
signiﬁcantly shorter when compared to the stable period before
(Kaburu et al., 2013; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013). For the pur-
poses of our analyses, we divided the data from M-group into two
periods, ‘stable’ or ‘unstable’ (following our previous practice:
Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013), depending on whether they were
collected before or after the killing of the alpha male, respectively.
Grooming was deﬁned as the visual examination, searching and
manipulation of the skin and hair with one or both hands, with the
aid occasionally of the lower lip to part the hair (Yerkes, 1933).
During grooming interactions, start and end timewere recorded, as
well as the identities of groomer and receiver. A grooming bout was
considered to have ended when neither individual groomed for at
least 30 s (Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013; Newton-Fisher & Lee,
2011). Except where stated otherwise, all our analyses of grooming
use durations (grooming effort: Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011), rather
than bout frequency. We follow Barrett et al. (1999) in deﬁning
reciprocity as the exchange of the same behaviour. We further
consider reciprocity as quantiﬁable (Mitani, 2009; Newton-Fisher
& Lee, 2011; Nishida, 1988; Silk, Seyfarth, & Cheney, 1999) such
that a dyad's degree of reciprocity is a measure of the extent to
which the members of that dyad match one another's investment
in terms of either effort or participation in bouts. In contrast to
cercopithecinemonkeys (Barrett et al., 1999), many grooming bouts
in chimpanzees include the simultaneous exchange of grooming in
addition to unidirectional grooming inwhich an individual is either
grooming or receiving, sometimes taking these roles alternately
(Goodall, 1986; Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2013). We consider here
only the total amount of grooming that was directed towards a
partner and do not distinguish between simultaneous and unidi-
rectional modes of delivery.
For these analyses, we restricted agonistic interactions to
physical (contact) aggression, chases and directed charging displays
(i.e. where these displays had a clear target, as chimpanzees will
often perform undirected charging displays, which we excluded);
we recorded time of occurrence, the identities of aggressor and
victim and type of aggression. We determined winners of agonistic
interactions from outcomes and the behaviour of the target of the
aggression. Agonistic support was identiﬁed when two males
either engaged together in charging displays against a group of
individuals, attacked a common victim at the same time, or when
one male intervened in favour of a second during an ongoing
conﬂict (Goodall, 1986; Nishida & Hosaka, 1996; Nishida, Kano,
Goodall, McGrew, & Nakamura, 1999): in addition to data on
aggression, we recorded the identities and roles of the participants.
As the possibility for individual A to support partner B depended on
the number of times B was involved in agonistic interactions, rates
of agonistic support were calculated by dividing the number of
times A supported B by the total number of agonistic interactions
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involving B, excluding those between A and B. We assessed toler-
ance using rates of aggressive interactions received, calculated by
dividing the number of times individual A attacked individual B by
the total number of attacks given by individual A.
Dyadic association was calculated by dividing the number of
15 min interval scan samples in which two males were observed
within the same party by the total number of scan samples, as
previous work has suggested that 15 min is a good interval to
consider data independent both for Sonso (Newton-Fisher, 1999a)
and M-group (Kutsukake, 2003) chimpanzees. Finally, after a suc-
cessful hunt, the identity of the individuals who shared the meat
was recorded (following Nishida et al., 1999).
Grooming Reciprocity
Degree of grooming reciprocity was calculated through the
reciprocity index RI (Mitani, 2009; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011;
Nishida, 1988):
RI ¼ 1
 gAbðgAbþ gBaÞ  gBaðgAbþ gBaÞ

in which gAb is the grooming that individual A directed towards B,
gBa is the grooming that B directed towards A and gAb þ gBa is the
total grooming exchanged between A and B. This index can range
between 0 (no reciprocity) and 1 (complete reciprocity).
To determine whether male chimpanzees reciprocated groom-
ing and/or traded it for other commodities we used linear mixed
model (LMM) analysis to test the relationship between a dependent
variable and multiple independent (or ﬁxed) factors while con-
trolling for the repeated sampling of the same individuals (Millar &
Anderson, 2004; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000; Zuur, Ieno, Walker,
Saveliev, & Smith, 2009). We used the ‘lme’ function in the ‘nlme’
package (Zuur et al., 2009) in R 2.14 (R Development Core Team,
2012). LMM models were ﬁtted with a Gaussian error structure
with restricted maximum likelihood. We checked that the as-
sumptions of homogeneity and normality of residuals of the
models were respected (Zuur et al., 2009). Grooming durations
were log transformed to achieve normality for the Sonso data and
for the M-group data during the period of social stability. For the
data collected during the period of social instability in M-group,
this transformation failed to normalize the data because of an
excessive number of zeros: LMM analysis requires a normally
distributed dependent variable (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000), so we
instead removed the zeros from the dependent variable (following
Gomes& Boesch, 2011) for this analysis. To assess the effect size of a
variable, we removed that variable to create a reduced model and
compared this to the complete model (i.e. the model containing all
the variables) through a likelihood ratio test (LRT: Pinheiro& Bates,
2000) using the R function ‘anova’.
Male Rank
We determined male dominance ranks across each of our study
periods (Sonso: 2003/2004; M-group: 2011) by calculating Elo-
ratings derived from directed aggressive interactions (Albers & de
Vries, 2001) using the R function ‘elo.sequence’ (Neumann et al.,
2011). This method allowed us to track rank over time and
thereby determine dominance ranks of interacting males on any
day for which grooming or other social interactions were recorded.
We conﬁrmed ranks were consistent with the direction of pant-
grunt vocalizations (performed by subordinates towards domi-
nants: Bygott, 1979; Goodall, 1986). Following convention, ordinal
rankings of males assigned a value of 1 to the highest-ranked
individual (the alpha male), with numerically larger values indi-
cating lower-ranked individuals.
Dominance Hierarchy Steepness
We also used our data on aggressive interactions to determine
the steepness of male dominance hierarchies for both Sonso 2003/
2004, and M-group 2011 using the R package ‘steepness’ (Leiva &
de Vries, 2011). This package calculates David's scores (DS: David,
1988) from dyadic agonistic interactions:
DS ¼ w þ w2  l  l2
where w represents the number of times an individual, A, wins, l is
the number of times A loses, w2 is the number of times individuals
defeated by Awin, and l2 is the number of times the individuals that
won against A lose. It normalizes the DS values and determines the
slope of the best-ﬁt line of these against dominance rank to
generate an index of hierarchy steepness that varies from 0 (ﬂat, or
egalitarian) to 1 (steep, or despotic). ‘Steepness’ also conducts a
permutation test (9999 replications) to determine whether a
detected degree of steepness is signiﬁcantly different from random
(de Vries, Stevens, & Vervaecke, 2006). To determine whether hi-
erarchy steepness varied within these communities, we also
calculated steepness values for the Sonso community in 1995
(Newton-Fisher, 1997, 2004, n.d.) and, using published interaction
matrices, for M-group in 1985/1986 (Hayaki, Huffman, & Nishida,
1989) and 1992 (Nishida, 2012; Nishida & Hosaka, 1996). To place
these dominance steepness values in cross-community context, we
used published data to calculate values for the Kanyawara (Kibale
National Park, Uganda) community in 1998 (Muller & Wrangham,
2004) and North group (Taï National Park, Cote D'Ivoire) in 1993
(Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000).
Tests of the Grooming-trade Model
Are there rank-related commodities?
Agonistic support. Although any individual in a community can
potentially offer agonistic support, requests for support are typi-
cally directed to the strongest (i.e. highest-ranking) individuals
(Harcourt& deWaal,1992). Among chimpanzees, agonistic support
is known to play a role in increasing or maintaining social domi-
nance rank (Gilby et al., 2013; Goodall, 1986; Nishida, 1983; Nishida
& Hosaka, 1996; de Waal, 1982) as well as increasing the likelihood
of achieving paternity independently of social rank effects (Gilby
et al., 2013). It is expected, therefore, to be a highly attractive
commodity. Among chimpanzees, as with other species, agonistic
support can be provided by more than one individual at the same
time (rarely more than two supporters; S. S. K. Kaburu & N. E.
Newton-Fisher, personal observations), and support can be mutual,
whereby two individuals initiate joint aggression against a third
party without any obvious solicitation. We considered all in-
teractions on a dyadic basis. To determine whether agonistic sup-
port could be considered a rank-related commodity, we extracted
all instances of agonistic support by adult males and determined (1)
mean dominance rank of the supporter(s) and (2) the correlation
between the frequency of support and dominance rank.
Social tolerance. Although tests of the grooming-trade model in
cercopithecines often include tolerance in feeding contexts as a
potential commodity (e.g. Carne et al., 2011; Ventura et al., 2006),
we did not include this in our analysis because male chimpanzees
rarely compete over access to food resources (except perhaps for
meat): most chimpanzee food (leaves, fruits: Newton-Fisher,
1999b; Nishida & Uehara, 1983) is difﬁcult to monopolize.
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Instead, we investigated general social tolerance, as indicated by
the receipt of aggression from other adult males. We reasoned that
individuals that are more tolerated would receive less aggression
and that males may be able to trade grooming for greater levels of
tolerance. We determined (1) mean dominance rank of an
aggressor and (2) the correlation between the frequency of
aggression performed and dominance rank.
Is grooming directed up the hierarchy?
To assess whether grooming is directed up the hierarchy, we
extracted the amount of grooming that males directed to higher-
ranking individuals and compared this to the amount we would
expect under a null hypothesis of an even allocation of grooming,
using a paired-samples t test. As the amount of grooming that amale
can direct up the hierarchy depends on the number of individuals
thatoutrankhim, expectedvalueswere calculatedbymultiplying the
total amount of grooming given by a male by the proportion of in-
dividuals ranking above him (after Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011): an
alpha male has no individuals ranked above him that he can groom;
the lowest-ranked individual is constrained to groom only in-
dividuals that rank above him. Thus, we tested the hypothesis that
male chimpanzees direct more of their grooming to those of higher
rank than would be expected given their own rank within the hier-
archy. Analysis of Sonsomales' grooming interactionswas conducted
using539bouts, totalling44.75 hof grooming.Meanbout lengthwas
299 ± 438 s. Analysis of M-groupmales' grooming interactions used
659bouts in the stable period (59.60 hof grooming) and266 bouts in
the unstable period (16.47 h of grooming). Mean bout lengths were
325 ± 449 s and 223 ± 279 s in the two periods, respectively.
Do dominants receive more grooming than subordinates?
To examine whether dominant males receive more grooming
than they give, for each male, we divided the total amount of
grooming they gave by the total amount of grooming they received
(GG/GR) and tested the correlation between this ratio and the
males' rank by Spearman's rank correlation.
Are closely ranked individuals more reciprocal in their grooming?
To test whether rank distance predicts the degree of reciprocity
in grooming effort (dRI), we constructed an LMM with dRI as the
dependent variable and rank distance as the ﬁxed factor, with the
identities of the dyad members and the within-dyad repeated
measurements treated as the random factors. Rank distance varied
over time for each dyad, so we determined the rank distance on the
day of each of the respective grooming interactions. As a conse-
quence, multiple rank distances existed for each maleemale pair,
and each dyadic rank distance value was therefore treated as the
repeated measurement.
Is total grooming effort spread across all potential partners?
We assessed the relationship between grooming effort and rank
distance by constructing an LMM inwhich the amount of grooming
exchanged was treated as the dependent variable and the rank
difference between groomers was entered as the ﬁxed factor while
the identity of the groomers was set as the random factor.
We assessed diversity of grooming partners using the stan-
dardized ShannoneWeaver index (Henzi, Lycett, &Weingrill, 1997;
Krebs, 1999; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011; Silk et al., 1999):
H0 ¼
 

Xn
i¼1
pi ln pi
!
=lnðn 1Þ
in which n represents the number of potential grooming partners
and pi the proportion of grooming directed to the ith individual.
This index takes a value of 1 if an individual grooms all partners
equally and tends towards 0 if grooming is directed to a subset of
potential partners. The standardized ShannoneWeaver index is
particularly useful when the number of available partners is con-
stant across all individuals, and is identical to the equitability index
(E) used by, for example, Dunbar (1984) and Watts (2000a). We
calculated diversity for both grooming bouts (H0bout) and effort
(H0duration) and compared these indices between communities us-
ing ManneWhitney U tests.
What is the relationship between hierarchy steepness and grooming
reciprocity?
To assess whether males of our two study communities differed
in the amount of reciprocal grooming, we calculated RI values for
each adult male dyad within each community using both duration
(dRI) and the frequency of bouts (fRI). These values were compared
between communities using independent-samples t tests. To
further examine grooming trading patterns in these two commu-
nities, and to control for possible inﬂuence of recipient's rank,
dyadic association and meat transfers on grooming behaviour,
further LMMs were created. In these models, duration of grooming
givenwas entered as the dependent variable; duration of grooming
received, support received, aggression received, and, for M-group
males during the stable period, meat received (30 hunts, 31 meat-
sharing sessions; meat sharing was too infrequent during the un-
stable period or among the Sonso males to be included) were
entered as the ﬁxed factors, while the identity of the males was set
as a random factor.
RESULTS
Hierarchy Steepness
Our tests of the grooming-trade model were between two
communities of chimpanzees with very different dominance hier-
archies (Fig. 1). While the mean ± SD steepness value across com-
munities was 0.40 ± 0.16, Sonsomales in 2003/2004 formed a steep
(despotic) hierarchy with a value of 0.70, somewhat steeper than
they had shown in 1994/1995 (steepness ¼ 0.40). By contrast, M-
0
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Figure 1. Dominance hierarchy steepness, indicated by the slope of the best-ﬁt line of
normalized David's score (NormDs) against dominance ranks among adult male
chimpanzees of the two study communities. Sonso chimpanzees (C, solid line, N ¼ 8)
show a steep (despotic) hierarchy, while for M-group chimpanzees (⋄, dashed line,
N ¼ 10), the hierarchy is shallow (egalitarian).
S. S. K. Kaburu, N. E. Newton-Fisher / Animal Behaviour xxx (2014) 1e11 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
YANBE20283_proof ■ 13 November 2014 ■ 5/11
Please cite this article in press as: Kaburu, S. S. K.,&Newton-Fisher, N. E., Egalitarian despots: hierarchy steepness, reciprocity and the grooming-
trade model in wild chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, Animal Behaviour (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.10.018
group males in 2011 formed a shallower (more egalitarian) hier-
archy, with a dominance hierarchy steepness of 0.30 during the
stable period. Males of this community also formed a shallow hi-
erarchy (steepness ¼ 0.22, P ¼ 0.0013) in 1985 (Hayaki et al., 1989),
but shallow hierarchies do not appear to be an inherent charac-
teristic of M-group: data from 1992 revealed a more despotic hi-
erarchy (steepness ¼ 0.57). During the unstable period in 2011, our
data on agonistic interactions produced a steepness value of 0.26,
not signiﬁcantly different from a random set of contest outcomes
(P ¼ 0.09). This suggests that the male dominance hierarchy
essentially collapsed following the death of the alpha male. By way
of comparison, chimpanzee males of North-group (Taï National
Park) in 1993 and of Kanyawara (Kibale National Park) in 1998 both
formed hierarchies with steepness values of 0.39. Except where
indicated, for all steepness values P < 0.001. Multiple zeros in the
1985 aggressionmatrix probably explainwhy this period generated
a steepness value that was lower, but still signiﬁcant, than the
nonsigniﬁcant value determined for the 2011 unstable period.
We noted that in M-group in 2011, seven (70%) of the adult
males were aged between 20 and 30, whereas only 3 (38%) of the
Sonso 2003/2004 males were in this age range: across commu-
nities, we found that hierarchy steepness was negatively related to
the number of adult males in this age bracket (Pearson correlation:
r6 ¼ 0.743, P ¼ 0.03).
Tests of the Grooming-trade Model
Are there rank-related commodities?
Agonistic support. In the Sonso community, the provision and fre-
quency of agonistic support was restricted largely to high-ranking
individuals. We recorded 62 instances of agonistic support, with
the alpha-, beta- and gamma-ranked males providing the majority
of support (78%). The mean rank of a supporter was 2.63. Dominant
male chimpanzees provided support signiﬁcantly more frequently
than did subordinates (Spearman rank correlation: rS ¼ 0.833,
N ¼ 8, P ¼ 0.015). In M-group during the period of social stability,
we recorded 30 instances of agonistic support. The three top-
ranking males provided only 44% of agonistic support, and the
mean rank of a supporter was 4.77. During the period of social
instability, we recorded 34 instances of agonistic support. The three
top-ranking males provided only 32% of agonistic support, and the
mean rank of a supporter was 4.88. There was no relationship
amongM-groupmales between support given and dominance rank
(stable period: rS ¼ 0.360, N ¼ 8, P ¼ 0.381; unstable period:
rS ¼ 0.071, N ¼ 7, P ¼ 0.906).
Social tolerance. We recorded 265 maleemale aggressive in-
teractions from Sonso community (meanwinner's rank ¼ 2.71) and
76 maleemale aggressive interactions from M-group chimpanzees
in the stable period (mean winner's rank ¼ 3.61) and 72 from the
unstable period (mean winner's rank ¼ 3.89). In neither commu-
nity were rates of aggression given related to dominance rank
(Sonso: rS ¼ 0.71, N ¼ 8, P ¼ 0.058; M-group stable: rS ¼ 0.64,
N ¼ 8, P ¼ 0.096; M-group unstable: rS ¼ 0.5, N ¼ 7, P ¼ 0.267).
Note, however, that observations at Sonso occurred during a period
when a mid-ranking adult male (NK) attempted to rise in social
rank. Excluding this individual's aggression produced a signiﬁcant
relation between aggression performed and rank (Sonso:
rS ¼ 0.93, N ¼ 7, P ¼ 0.007).
Is grooming directed up the hierarchy?
Sonso males directed a signiﬁcant amount (60%) of their
grooming effort up the hierarchy (paired-samples t test: t7 ¼ 2.971,
P ¼ 0.021), while this was not the case among M-group males: in
the stable period, 49% of grooming effort was directed towards
dominants (t9 ¼ 1.794, P ¼ 0.106); in the unstable period, 52% of
grooming effort was directed up the hierarchy (t8 ¼ 0.980,
P ¼ 0.356). Thus, among Sonso males (despotic hierarchy), but not
M-group males (egalitarian hierarchy), subordinates directed a
greater proportion of their grooming effort towards dominants.
Do dominants receive more grooming than subordinates?
We found a signiﬁcant relationship between the ratio of
grooming given to grooming received (GG/GR) and social rank for
Sonso males (Spearman rank correlation: rS ¼ 0.905, N ¼ 8,
P ¼ 0.002), but not for M-group males (stable period: rS ¼ 0.030,
N ¼ 10, P ¼ 0.934; unstable period: rS ¼ 0.383, N ¼ 9, P ¼ 0.308).
Thus, in Sonso (despotic) but not M-group (egalitarian), dominants
received more grooming than they performed, which suggests the
presence of outbidding competition among the Sonso males.
Are closely ranked individuals more reciprocal in their grooming?
The greater the rank distance, the less balanced was grooming
effort within dyads for the Sonso (despotic hierarchy) males (LMM:
dRI: b ± SE ¼ 0.076 ± 0.026, t ¼ 2.914, P ¼ 0.005), while this was
not the case for M-group (egalitarian hierarchy) males, for whom
we found no evidence of any relationship between rank distance
and reciprocity, either in the stable period (dRI:
b ± SE ¼ 0.026 ± 0.015, t ¼ 1.700, P ¼ 0.121) or the unstable
period (dRI: b ± SE ¼ 0.007 ± 0.019, t ¼ 0.370, P ¼ 0.672). Thus,
under the despotic hierarchy, where agonistic support was avail-
able as a commodity, close-ranked individuals were more recip-
rocal in their grooming.
Is total grooming effort spread across all potential partners?
In both communities, adult males allocated some grooming to
most available partners (mean ± SD: H0bout: Sonso: 0.64 ± 0.06; M-
group: stable: 0.82 ± 0.12; unstable: 0.71 ± 0.14; H0duration: Sonso:
0.60 ± 0.18; M-group: stable: 0.78 ± 0.13; unstable: 0.65 ± 0.17). By
way of comparison, mean H0bout for adult males of the Sonso
community in 1994/1995 was 0.82 (Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011).
Sonsomales directed grooming to fewer partners than didM-group
males during the stable period (ManneWhitney U test: H0bout:
W ¼ 69, N1 ¼8, N2 ¼ 10, P ¼ 0.008; H0duration: W ¼ 64, N1 ¼8,
N2 ¼ 10, P ¼ 0.034), but during the unstable period, males of the
two communities did not differ in the number of grooming part-
ners (H0bout: W ¼ 50, N1 ¼8, N2 ¼ 9, P ¼ 0.200; H0duration: W ¼ 44,
N1 ¼8, N2 ¼ 9, P ¼ 0.481).
We found an inverse relationship between grooming effort and
rank distance in Sonso: the shorter was the rank difference be-
tween groomers, the more grooming they exchanged (LMM:
b ± SE ¼ 0.435 ± 0.141, t ¼ 3.092, P ¼ 0.006), but adult males of
this community did not direct most grooming towards partners of
adjacent social rank (Fig. 2). There was no relationship between
grooming effort and rank distance for the M-group males (stable:
b ± SE ¼ 0.017 ± 0.077, t ¼ 0.219, P ¼ 0.792; unstable:
b ± SE ¼ 0.052 ± 0.069, t ¼ 0.749, P ¼ 0.460).
What is the relationship between hierarchy steepness and grooming
reciprocity?
We found no statistically signiﬁcant difference between com-
munities in the degree to which male chimpanzees reciprocated
grooming effort (independent-samples t test: Sonso versus M-
group stable: t68 ¼ 0.721, P ¼ 0.475; Sonso versus M-group unsta-
ble: t51 ¼ 0.417, P ¼ 0.679), although M-group males were more
reciprocal in the frequency of bouts exchanged during the stable
period (mean fRI: Sonso ¼ 0.45; M-group ¼ 0.66; t68 ¼ 2.458,
P ¼ 0.019).
For the Sonso males, distribution of grooming effort was pre-
dicted by both rates of support (LMM: b ± SE ¼ 8.029 ± 1.888,
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t ¼ 4.251, P ¼ 0.001) and grooming effort received
(b ± SE ¼ 0.679 ± 0.088, t ¼ 7.718, P < 0.001). Both variables exer-
ted a signiﬁcant inﬂuence: the reduced model that excluded either
grooming received or support received showed a signiﬁcantly
inferior ﬁt compared to the complete model (LRT, without
grooming received: c21 ¼ 34.53, P < 0.001; without support
received: c21 ¼ 18.29, P < 0.001). By contrast, rates of aggression
received did not predict the distribution of grooming given
(b ± SE ¼ 0.187 ± 0.447, t ¼ 0.418, P ¼ 0.678). The model that
included dyadic association and recipient's dominance ranks
showed that grooming received and recipient's ranks were the only
signiﬁcant predictors of grooming given (grooming:
b ± SE ¼ 0.655 ± 0.079, t ¼ 8.317, P < 0.001; recipient's rank:
b ± SE ¼ 0.132 ± 0.034, t ¼ 3.851, P < 0.001).
For the M-group males during the period of social stability,
grooming given was signiﬁcantly predicted by grooming received
(b ± SE ¼ 0.721 ± 0.083, t ¼ 8.641, P < 0.001), whereas no relation-
ship between grooming given and the receipt of other services was
found: agonistic support (b ± SE ¼ 2.487 ± 1.790, t ¼ 1.389,
P ¼ 0.169), meat sharing (b ± SE ¼ 0.435 ± 0.300, t ¼ 1.450,
P ¼ 0.151) or aggression received (b ± SE ¼ 0.396 ± 0.602, t ¼ 0.657,
P ¼ 0.513). The reduced model that did not include grooming
received had a signiﬁcantly inferior ﬁt compared to the complete
model (LRT: c21 ¼ 50.61, P < 0.001). When dyadic association and
recipient's dominance ranks were included in the model, grooming
received still had a positive effect on grooming given
(b ± SE ¼ 0.576 ± 0.094, t ¼ 6.152, P < 0.001). While grooming
givenwas not signiﬁcantly predicted by recipient's dominance rank
(b ± SE ¼ 0.060 ± 0.043, t ¼ 1.803, P ¼ 0.075), it was positively
inﬂuenced by dyadic association (b ± SE ¼ 7.452 ± 2.708,
t ¼ 2.7511, P ¼ 0.007).
Similar results were found during the period of social instability:
grooming received was a signiﬁcant predictor of grooming given
(b ± SE ¼ 0.515 ± 0.134, t ¼ 3.841, P < 0.001), and removing
grooming received from the model resulted in a signiﬁcantly
inferior ﬁt (LRT: c21 ¼ 12.99, P < 0.001); rerunning the analysis
including zeros in the dependent variable did not change the re-
sults (with grooming received: b ± SE ¼ 0.650 ± 0.093, t ¼ 6.955,
P < 0.001; LRT of the model without grooming received:
c21 ¼ 44.59, P < 0.001). In the model that included dyadic
association and recipient's dominance rank, grooming received
continued to have a signiﬁcant effect (b ± SE ¼ 0.40 ± 0.15, t ¼ 2.59,
P ¼ 0.01). Recipient's dominance rank did not exert a signiﬁcant
effect (b ± SE ¼ 0.35 ± 1.76, t ¼ 0.20, P ¼ 0.84), and in contrast
to the results from the period of social stability, dyadic association
was no longer a predictor of grooming given
(b ± SE ¼ 69.19 ± 54.90, t ¼ 1.26, P ¼ 0.22).
Thus, the analysis using LMM conﬁrmed that for males in both
communities the amount of grooming given was predicted by the
amount of grooming received; that therewas a strong reciprocity of
grooming regardless of whether the dominance hierarchy could be
characterized as despotic or egalitarian. It also showed that
agonistic support was only a predictor of grooming given among
males of the despotic Sonso community and not among males of
the egalitarian M-group, for whom association was a signiﬁcant
predictor.
DISCUSSION
We found considerable variation in hierarchy steepness within
and across communities. In accord with the grooming-trademodel,
our comparison between the two communities at the extremes of
the hierarchy steepness distribution showed that adult male
chimpanzees will trade grooming for agonistic support where this
(or at least its likely effectiveness) is a rank-related commodity.
Among Sonso males, which showed steep rank relationships: (1)
dominants provided more agonistic support than subordinates; (2)
males directed grooming up the hierarchy; (3) the ratio of groom-
ing given to that received was lower for dominants than for sub-
ordinates. These results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that the
tendency of Sonso male chimpanzees to groom up the hierarchy
(Newton-Fisher,1997; Newton-Fisher& Lee, 2011) is best explained
as a subordinate's strategy to obtain rank-related beneﬁts from
dominants. Accordingly, our results suggest that Sonso males were
more likely to provide support to partners that groomed them
more and that this relationship between grooming given and
support received was not a by-product of grooming reciprocity. By
contrast, among M-group males with a shallow hierarchy during
the study period, high-ranking individuals did not offer agonistic
support more frequently than low-ranking males and dominance
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Figure 2. Mean allocation of grooming effort to individuals of increasing rank distance from the groomer, assessed across all adult male chimpanzees of both Sonso and M-group.
Proportion of grooming allocation expected under Seyfarth's (1977) model of social grooming was determined using the negative exponential function f ðxÞ ¼ 1:73ex , a mathe-
matical interpretation of the model's prediction that grooming should be allocated mostly to individuals of adjacent dominance ranks. The constant (1.73) scales the function such
that it allocates 100% of grooming across potential rank distances, while assigning the majority of this to adjacently ranked individuals (rank distance ¼ 1). M-group chimpanzees
did not allocate grooming according to this model (stable period: rS ¼ 0.28, N ¼ 9, P ¼ 0.460; unstable period: rS ¼ 0.55, N ¼ 8, P ¼ 0.160); for Sonso chimpanzees there was a
signiﬁcant correlation between observed and predicted values (rS ¼ 0.89, N ¼ 7, P ¼ 0.007), but contrary to the model most grooming was not allocated to adjacently ranked
individuals.
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rank did not appear to affect grooming distribution. Furthermore,
(4) in Sonso, but not M-group, males of similar dominance rank
showed stronger reciprocity than those who held more distant
ranks. In these respects male chimpanzees behaved much like fe-
male cercopithecoid monkeys, and their behaviour matched the
predictions of the grooming-trade model. However, in contrast to
the predictions of the model, males of the more egalitarian M-
group did not exchange grooming more reciprocally than Sonso
males: grooming reciprocity was not inﬂuenced by hierarchy
steepness.
We found that total grooming effort was not restricted to in-
dividuals of adjacent rank (contra Seyfarth's (1977) model of social
grooming) and that the number of grooming partners was lower
among the more despotic Sonso chimpanzees, where adult males
also exchanged more grooming with individuals closer to them in
social rank (contra BMT). As restriction on the diversity of grooming
partners is an expected outcome of the competitive mechanism in
Seyfarth's model, these results suggest that where agonistic sup-
port is available as a commodity, competitive restrictions may
impinge on the free market envisioned under BMT: although our
results do not support the strict priority of access mechanism in
Seyfarth's model, they may indicate agonistic competition with
lower-ranking individuals being excluded from grooming
opportunities.
Vehrencamp (1983) introduced the terms ‘despotic’ and ‘egali-
tarian’ to the study of animal behaviour to describe end points on a
continuum of the degree of bias in which beneﬁts are distributed
within a social group. Similarly, van Schaik (1989) used the terms to
refer to the relative steepness of a dominance hierarchy, for which
de Vries et al. (2006) provided a measure. This is the way in which
the terms have been used in this study. There is, however, a
different usage of the same terminology. de Waal (1989) and Flack
and de Waal (2004), for instance, use despotic and egalitarian to
refer to behavioural style: the manner in which dominants and
subordinates behave towards one another. In their terminology,
despotic species are those in which dominant animals exploit
subordinates, whereas in egalitarian species, dominants are more
tolerant, levels of aggression are lower and subordinates can
retaliate against dominants. While the two sets of terminology
might in some cases coalesce, this is not necessarily the case in
either theory or practice: de Waal's (1989) usage refers to charac-
teristics of relationships (the abstraction of interactions between
particular pairs of individuals: Hinde,1976), whereas Vehrencamp's
(1983) and van Schaik's (1989) usage refers to social structure (the
abstraction of relationships: Hinde, 1976). Male chimpanzees show
substantial tolerance towards subordinates, provide agonistic
support and maintain strong and reciprocal grooming relation-
ships, so tend towards ‘egalitarian’ by de Waal's (1989) deﬁnition,
yet they are ‘despotic’ by Vehrencamp's (1983) deﬁnition as ben-
eﬁts are biased towards high-ranking individuals: for example,
paternity for males (Boesch, Kohou, Nene, & Vigilant, 2006; Inoue,
Inoue-Murayama, Vigilant, Takenaka, & Nishida, 2008; Newton-
Fisher, Emery Thompson, Reynolds, Boesch, & Vigilant, 2010;
Wroblewski et al., 2009) and resource quality for females (Pusey,
Williams, & Goodall, 1997). The use of identical terminology to
refer both to aspects of relationships and structure is unfortunate,
but probably too ingrained to change.
In this study, we found that the number of adult males aged
20e30 years predicted hierarchy steepness. This is typically the
period in which males compete for, or hold, high rank, although
some males may claim alpha rank earlier (e.g. Nishida, 2012) and
some can hold it through their thirties (e.g. Newton-Fisher et al.,
2010; Nishida, 2012). For M-group in 2011, 70% of adult males
were in this age range, twice the average proportion (0.37 ± 0.08)
across the other communities. Together with the variation in
hierarchy steepness found across and within communities, this
ﬁnding suggests that the degree of structural despotism/egalitari-
anism is not an inherent characteristic of species, at least for
chimpanzees, but reﬂects a sociodemographic process: where
there are more equally matched competitors, each striving for high
rank, their very competition constrains the ability of any one in-
dividual to establish a despotic position over the others. This could
explain why captive studies have produced contradictory de-
scriptions of chimpanzee dominance style (despotic: Hare, Melis,
Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007; egalitarian: Jaeggi et al.,
2010) and we should be wary, therefore, of attempts to classify
the social structure of a species as despotic or egalitarian without
considerable empirical support from multiple social groups with
varying demography.
Our ﬁnding that grooming reciprocity persists in the face of
variation in hierarchy steepness is contrary to the grooming-trade
model, which suggests that grooming reciprocity should be
weaker when grooming can be traded for alternative services
(Barrett et al., 2002, 1999). Our LMM analysis showed that the
amount of grooming received was the primary predictor for the
amount of grooming given for both M-group and Sonso, where
support received was also signiﬁcant. This suggests that grooming
is sufﬁciently valuable to male chimpanzees that they will continue
to trade for it when other services are available and for which they
also trade. In the biological markets framework, services for which
supply is high should have low value: our results suggest therefore
that supply is restricted, or alternatively that demand is high.
Grooming bestows hygienic (Akinyi et al., 2013; Tanaka &
Takefushi, 1993; Zamma, 2002) and stress relief beneﬁts (Boccia,
Reite, & Laudenslager, 1989; Shutt, MacLarnon, Heistermann, &
Semple, 2007). These may be important and sought after by male
chimpanzees (Newton-Fisher, 2014), yet by grooming others, a
male chimpanzee is providing these beneﬁts to his main repro-
ductive rivals: this represents a relative cost to the groomer, and
males should, therefore, restrict the number of others with whom
they exchange grooming. If the primary means of gaining access to
the beneﬁts of grooming is to provide grooming (as our results
indicate), male chimpanzees should therefore engage in a limited
number of reciprocal grooming arrangements (as shown by Mitani,
2009; Newton-Fisher & Lee, 2011). Supply is therefore restricted: if
a male cannot offer effective agonistic support (we found no evi-
dence for meat exchange or tolerance as services for which
grooming is traded), he must rely on these reciprocal grooming
partners unless he can coerce individuals into grooming him.
Within particular grooming dyads, the reciprocal exchange of
grooming-derived beneﬁts suggests chimpanzees are egalitarian,
yet if these reciprocal grooming arrangements exist as a result of a
need to minimize the provision of beneﬁts to rivals, this egalitari-
anism seems forced. Where opportunities exist to exert dominance
over others, such as when the number of competitive rivals is small,
male chimpanzees strive to establish themselves at the top of a
clear hierarchy, and so in M-group in 2011, the large number of
more-or-less equally matched males may have created a situation
in which efforts to impose dominance by one male created op-
portunities that could be exploited by equally well-placed rivals.
Our results indicate that the social structure of chimpanzeemales is
best considered essentially despotic, in that they seek to dominate
others and establish hierarchies with consequent rank-biased dis-
tribution of beneﬁts, and that, despite showing somewhat egali-
tarian dominance styles (sensu de Waal, 1989), tendencies towards
apparent structural egalitarianism are likely to be the result of
competitive constraints on this despotism.
Overall, our ﬁndings support the assertion that grooming stra-
tegies of male chimpanzees have been shaped by natural selection
as modelled by BMT. We show that under the conditions of a steep
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dominance hierarchy, agonistic support is a commodity largely
restricted to high-ranking individuals, and that male chimpanzees
will trade grooming in order to access this commodity; this pattern
is not seen when hierarchy is ﬂatter and provision of agonistic
support is less related to male social rank. Reciprocal exchange of
grooming (trading grooming to receive grooming in return) is
important regardless of hierarchy steepness, so in contrast to the
‘grooming-trade’ model developed for cercopithecines, grooming
among adult male chimpanzees cannot be regarded as a low-value
commodity for which individuals will trade only when other
commodities are not available. Our ﬁndings also hint at the possi-
bility of agonistic competition, or at least exclusion, in relation to
grooming opportunities compromising the free market envisioned
by biological market theory. Our results build on previous ﬁndings
across chimpanzee communities to emphasize the importance of
reciprocal grooming exchanges among adult male chimpanzees,
which can be understood in a biological markets framework if
grooming, at least by or with particular individuals, is a valuable
commodity.
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